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MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
I.

Historical Background of Fisheries Management in the United States
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) is the

primary governing law for fisheries management in the United States. 1 The MSA, as it is known
today, evolved from state regulations and a series of national examinations of the management of
fisheries in the United States. Over the years, the MSA has seen several amendments and
continues to be the subject of contentious debate and litigation in response to rapidly evolving
information and policy objectives.
a.

Before the Magnuson-Stevens Act

Historically, U.S. fisheries were managed by an array of state regulations that primarily
focused on fishing gear restrictions.2 Federal trade and ship-licensing laws also had an impact on
fisheries in the early 1800s.3 As early as 1870, the federal government became directly involved
with fisheries management through the development of the U.S. Commission on Fish and
Fisheries.4 However, the states retained management of coastal fisheries, while “the commission
itself focused most of its attention on discovering new stocks of fish, developing innovative
fishing technology, and promoting fish sales.”5
The U.S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries was moved around different U.S.
departments, first to the Department of Commerce in 1903,6 then to the Department of the
Interior in 1939.7 In 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, which granted coastal

1

See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891(d) (2007).
JOSH EAGLE, ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS 8 (2003).
3
EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
4
Id. at 9.
5
Id.
6
Id. Under the Department of Commerce, the Commission was renamed the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries.
7
Id. Under the Department of the Interior, the Commission became a division of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
2
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states the authority to regulate fishing activities within three miles of the shore.8 Several years
later in 1970, President Richard Nixon created the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce, which provided for the federal
management of fisheries under the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).9
b.

Enactment of the Magnuson-Stevens Act

After its creation, NMFS initially focused on finding ways to help states implement better
fisheries management plans in order to more effectively control coastal fish stocks. 10

Of

particular concern was the threat to coastal fish stocks from “massive foreign fishing fleets in
waters adjacent to [] coastal areas,” which contributed to fish stock damage and interfered with
domestic fishing efforts.11 Led by Senator Warren Magnuson, Congress passed the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act in 1976,12 which declared a Fishery Conservation Zone
(FCZ) that extended from state seaward boundaries (generally three miles offshore) to 200 miles
offshore. 13 In 1980, the act was retitled the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management
Act in recognition of Senator Magnuson‟s leadership.14 In 1996 the Act was given its current
name, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens
Act or MSA), which reflected Senator Ted Stevens‟ contributions to the 1996 MSA
amendments.15

8

See Submerged Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-3015 (2000). The seaward boundaries of Texas, Puerto Rico, and
the Gulf coast of Florida extend nine nautical miles seaward of the shore. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121
(1960); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
9
EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 10.
10
Id.
11
16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(3) (2007).
12
94 Pub. L. No. 265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976).
13
See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891(d) (2007).
14
96 Pub. L. No. 561, 94 Stat. 3275 (1980).
15
104 Pub. L. No. 208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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In its original 1976 draft, the MSA excluded foreign fishing fleets from U.S. waters, and
encouraged the development and management of U.S. fisheries.16 The U.S. claimed exclusive
authority to manage and regulate all marine life within the FCZ, except “birds, marine mammals,
and highly migratory species of tuna.”17 In 1983, the MSA was amended to reflect President
Ronald Reagan‟s proclamation that established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), extending
200 miles seaward from shore in accordance with Part VI of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).18 Since 1976, the MSA has been amended several times in
response to increased scientific knowledge and evolving policy goals.
c.

Amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act

One of the first major amendments to the MSA occurred in 1990 when tuna and other
highly migratory species were brought within U.S. management authority under the MSA.19
While the MSA could have originally been interpreted and implemented in a more conservationoriented manner, “the goal was to build domestic fisheries with a focus on efficiency and
economic growth."20 After continuous signs of decreasing fish stocks, marine conservation
groups insisted that the MSA be amended in order to better protect the fisheries.21
In 1996, Congress passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act, amending the MSA and shifting
its goals from a policy focused on the fishing industry, to a policy that made fishery conservation
and ecosystem protection its primary purpose.22 The most recent amendment to the MSA
occurred on January 12, 2007, when President Bush signed the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
16

See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891(d) (2007).
JOSEPH J. KALO, ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 513 (3d ed. 2002).
18
Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10601 (Mar. 11, 1983).
19
KALO, ET AL., supra note 17 at 514.
20
NOAA Fisheries Service, Statement from the Director: President Bush Signs Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/mediacenter/docs/Director_Statement_011207.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010)
[hereinafter Statement].
21
DONALD C. BAUR, ET AL., OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 280 n.67-68 (2007).
22
Id. at 280 n.66.
17
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Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006.23 Under the latest amendment, the
MSA called for an immediate end to overfishing through the use of annual catch limits and
accountability measures, encouraged market-based fishery management through limited access
privilege programs, and mandated increased international cooperation.24
II.

Structure of the Magnuson-Stevens Act
a.

Eight Regional Fishery Management Councils

In order to conserve and manage fish stocks and essential fish habitats, the MagnusonStevens Act established eight Regional Fishery Management Councils (Councils).25

Each

Council is charged with creating a Fishery Management Plan (FMP), holding public hearings in
order to allow interested persons a chance to comment on the development of the FMPs, and
setting annual catch limits for each fishery within its region. 26 The number of members on each
Council generally depends upon the number of states and U.S. territories bordering the managed
area, although certain Councils are subject to exceptions.27
Each Council consists of voting and nonvoting members;28 voting members are further
characterized as “required” or “appointed” members.29 Required Council members include the
state official in charge of marine fishery management in each coastal state, as well as a NMFS
regional director for the geographic area within the Council‟s jurisdiction.30 However, if there is
more than one NMFS director within a Council‟s jurisdiction, the Secretary of Commerce

23

Statement, supra note 20.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(h)(5)-(7), 1854(e)(3) (2007).
25
Id. § 1852(a)(1). The eight Regional Fishery Management Councils include: New England Council, Mid-Atlantic
Council, South Atlantic Council, Caribbean Council, Gulf Council, Pacific Council, North Pacific Council, and
Western Pacific Council. Id.
26
Id. § 1852(h)(1), (3), (6).
27
Id. § 1852(a)(1).
28
Id. § 1852(b), (c).
29
Id. § 1852(b)(1).
30
16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(1)(A), (B) (2007).
24
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(Secretary) decides which one will serve as the Council‟s voting member.31 In addition to the
state and federal officials, coastal state governors may nominate citizens to the Council based on
their knowledge regarding the conservation and management, or commercial or recreational
harvest, of fish stocks within the Council‟s geographic area.32 The Secretary then decides
whether the nominated citizens will become “appointed” members.33
Nonvoting members on each Council include representatives from the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Fisheries Commission, and U.S. Department of
State.34 The Pacific Council also has one nonvoting member who is appointed by the Governor
of Alaska.35
Each regional Council is required to create a scientific and statistical committee to help
with the “development, collection, evaluation, and peer review” of information that may be used
by the Council to develop and amend a management plan.36 Similarly, each Council must form a
fishing industry advisory committee to provide advice and assistance for the development of
fishery management plans and amendments.37

In addition to these two required advisory

committees, Councils may establish other advisory committees, if needed, to fulfill their duties
under the MSA38 While the fishing industry “dominates all the nonscientific advisory groups, []
the ultimate management decisions remain with Council members themselves.”39

31

Id. § 1852(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A).
33
Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A). Appointed members “must be individuals who, by reason of their occupational or other
experience, scientific expertise, or training, are knowledgeable regarding the conservation and management, or the
commercial or recreational harvest, of the fishery resources of the geographical area concerned.” Id.
34
Id. § 1852(c)(1).
35
Id. § 1852(c)(2).
36
16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(1)(A) (2007).
37
Id. § 1852(g)(3)(A).
38
Id. § 1852(g)(2).
39
EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 16.
32
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III.

Management Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act
a.

Overall Management Scheme: FMPs, PMPs, and GIFAs

Under the MSA, Councils prepare Fishery Management Plans (FMPs) for each fishery
within their respective jurisdiction that “requires conservation and management.” 40 FMPs are
used to “prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, and to protect, restore, and promote
the long-term health and stability of [] [fisheries].”41 Once a Council has developed the FMP or
amendment for domestic and foreign fishing within a particular fishery, the Secretary must then
approve, disapprove, or partially approve the FMP.42
If a foreign nation requests a permit to fish in an area without any FMP, the Secretary
may prepare a Preliminary Fishery Management Plan (PMP) to cover such foreign fishing
activities.43 Governing International Fishery Agreements (GIFAs) may be negotiated between
the Secretary and foreign nations requesting to fish within the U.S. EEZ, which then must be
ratified by Congress.44 When a Council fails to develop a needed FMP, the Secretary may
prepare the FMP, in which case it will cover both domestic and foreign fishing.45
b.

Magnuson-Stevens Act Ten “National Standards”

The preparation and implementation of FMPs must be consistent with ten “national
standards” (National Standards) set out in the MSA as follows: (1) prevent overfishing and
achieve optimum yield for each fishery; (2) use the “best scientific information available”; (3)
manage fish stocks as units and coordinate with other Councils to manage stocks within multiple
jurisdictions; (4) allocate fishing privileges in a “fair and equitable” manner; (5) efficiently
40

16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(A) (2007).
Id. § 1853(a)(1)(A).
42
Id. § 1854(a)(3).
43
Id. § 1821(g).
44
Id. § 1821(c).
45
Id. § 1854(c)(1). Fisheries that are currently managed by the Secretary include the “Atlantic swordfish, Atlantic
sharks, and Atlantic billfish”; “the Western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery is managed under the [MSA] and the
Atlantic Tunas Convention Act.” DENNIS W. NIXON, ET AL., MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 305, 306 (2d ed. 2010).
41
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manage fisheries without solely focusing on economic allocation; (6) allow flexibility for future
changes that may affect conservation and management; (7) minimize costs and “avoid
unnecessary duplication”; (8) consider the needs of fishing communities, encourage community
participation, and “minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities”; (9) “to the extent
practicable,” minimize bycatch and the mortality of unavoidable bycatch; and (10) “to the extent
practicable . . . promote the safety of human life at sea.”46
c.

Provisions of Fishery Management Plans

In addition to meeting the ten National Standards, the MSA requires specific information,
management objectives, and provisions to be included in each Councils‟ FMPs. The MSA
breaks down the FMP regulations into “required provisions”47 and “discretionary provisions,”48
and provides for specific deadlines49 and “limited access privilege programs” (LAPPs).50 As
discussed in Part III(c)(i), the 2006 amendments made significant changes to FMP requirements
in order to more effectively conserve and manage fisheries.
i.

Required Provisions

Every FMP is required to contain specific information about the fishery for which the
FMP has been established, including economic, biological, and ecological information.

A

description of the fishery should include, but is not limited to, the fish species, the number of
vessels used, the type of fishing gear used, management costs, actual and potential revenues from
the fishery, trends in landings, recreational and commercial interest in the fishery, and whether
foreign fishing or Indian treaty fishing occurs for the particular species involved.51 FMPs that

46

16 U.S.C. § 1851 (a)(1)-(10) (2007).
Id. § 1853(a).
48
Id. § 1853(b).
49
Id. § 1853 note.
50
Id. §§ 1853(a)(13), 1853a.
51
Id. § 1853(a)(2).
47
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are submitted to the Secretary for approval must “specify the nature and extent of scientific data
which is needed for effective implementation.”52 The essential fish habitat for the fishery must
be identified and described, and the FMP must “minimize to the extent practicable adverse
effects on such habitat caused by fishing.”53
Another requirement for FMPs is that Councils must “assess and specify” the maximum
sustainable yield and optimum yield for the fishery, and include details about how those yields
were established.54 For each FMP, a fishery impact statement must be submitted to the Secretary
and include the “cumulative conservation, economic, and social impacts, of the conservation and
management measures” on fishery participants and communities, adjacent fisheries, and the
safety of fishermen.55 Also, in accordance with National Standard one, objective and measurable
criteria must be included in the FMP to determine when the fishery is overfished, how to prevent
or end overfishing, and how to rebuild the fishery.56

The criteria used to make these

determinations must be supported by scientific data.57
FMPs must minimize the bycatch and the mortality of bycatch within a fishery “to the
extent practicable.”58

Councils must develop a “standardized reporting methodology” for

bycatch59 and determine the mortality of fish caught by catch-and-release.60 This provision was
added to the MSA in the 1996 amendments, as was the provision requiring the minimization of
impacts of fishing and fishing gear on essential fish habitat.61 Both amendments were intended
to remedy past failures of Councils to properly manage fish stocks, although the language “to the
52

16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(8) (2007).
Id. § 1853(a)(7).
54
Id. § 1853(a)(3).
55
Id. § 1853(a)(9).
56
Id. § 1853(a)(10).
57
Id.
58
16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(11) (2007).
59
Id.
60
Id. § 1853(a)(12).
61
BAUR, ET AL., supra note 21, at 282 n.98.
53
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extent practicable” still provides flexibility.62 As discussed in Part V(b), Councils have used this
language in order to “avoid gear restrictions or area closures that would be unpopular among
members of the fishing community, whether such measures might be „practicable‟ or not.”63
When the MSA was most recently amended in 2006, Congress sought to prevent
Councils from delaying proper management by requiring Councils, beginning in 2009, to “end
overfishing immediately.”64

Now, Councils must establish annual catch limits for U.S.

commercial and recreational fisheries subject to overfishing by 2010, and for all other stocks by
2011.65 Councils must also have measures to ensure accountability with these limits, and annual
catch limits “may not exceed the fishing level recommendations of [a Council‟s] scientific and
statistical committee.”66
In 2009, NMFS published guidelines for the 2006 amendments in the Federal Register,
which “outline a system of catch limits, reference points and targets that can be used for each
stock to prevent overfishing.”67

This system mandates strong accountability measures and

provides for scientific uncertainty when determining catch limits for a stock.68 Fishermen have
expressed their fears that the 2006 amendments are overly restrictive, based on inadequate
scientific data, and may result in the closure of popular fish species.

69

While the strict legal

mandates in the 2006 amendments seek to finally achieve the MSA objectives of ending

62

See id.
BAUR, ET AL., supra note 21, at 282 (citing Pac. Marine Conservation Council, Inc. v. Evans, 200 F. Supp. 2d
1194 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
64
16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(3) (2007).
65
Id. §§ 1853(a)(15), 1853 note (1)(A),(B).
66
Id. § 1852(h)(6).
67
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA Issues Final Guidance on Annual Catch Limits to End
Overfishing, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2009/20090115_endoverfishing.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2010)
[hereinafter NOAA Final Guidance]; 74 Fed. Reg. 11 (Jan. 16, 2009).
68
Id.
69
NOAA Final Guidance, supra note 67.
63
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overfishing, fishermen are concerned that such an objective may only be feasible by completely
closing certain fisheries.70
ii.

Discretionary Provisions and Limited Access Privilege Programs (LAPP)

In addition to the many FMP requirements, Councils have the authority to take other
discretionary measures to conserve and manage fisheries. For example, Councils may require
fishing vessels within U.S. jurisdiction, or fish processors receiving fish under an FMP, to obtain
a fishing permit from the Secretary.71 Furthermore, Councils may limit fishermen to certain
areas and types of vessels or gear used,72 establish a “limited access system” for fishermen in
order to achieve optimum yield,73 and require fisheries observers aboard fishing vessels in order
to collect scientific data.74
Under the 2006 amendments, another discretionary measure left to Councils is whether to
manage a fishery by using a limited access privilege program (LAPP). 75 A LAPP allows a
Council to allocate to “individual fishermen (or vessel owners) the privilege of catching a
percentage share of the total amount of fish made available to the fishery each year.” 76 LAPP
shares are not considered property, but rather are considered “a grant of permission” to the
shareholder to “engage in activities permitted by such limited access privilege or quota share.”77
Any Council utilizing LAPPs in a fishery that is overfished or subject to a rebuilding
plan, must ensure that the LAPPs will assist in its rebuilding; similarly, for a fishery that is overcapacity, the LAPP must help reduce capacity.78 The LAPP must generally promote safety,

70

Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(1) (2007).
72
Id. § 1853(b)(2).
73
Id. § 1853(b)(6).
74
Id. § 1853(b)(8).
75
Id. § 1853a(a).
76
BAUR, ET AL., supra note 21, at 283.
77
16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b)(5) (2007).
78
Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(A),(B).
71
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conservation and management, as well as social and economic benefits of the fishery. 79 In
addition, all LAPPs must provide for fishery monitoring and enforcement,80 fish processing on
U.S. vessels or soil,81 an appeals process for initial allocation decisions, 82 and a system for
collecting information to determine whether “illegal acts of anti-competition, anti-trust, price
collusion, or price fixing have occurred.”83
Deciding allocation shares can be a difficult and controversial process. In developing a
LAPP, Councils must use a procedure that is fair and equitable for allocating initial shares. 84
According to a technical memorandum issued by NMFS in November, 2007, “[t]wo important
objectives of an initial allocation procedure are that it should be as administratively simple as
possible and it should rely on generally available and transparent data.” 85 The Council “should
consider the cultural and social framework of the fishery.”86 One of the issues that can arise in
LAPPs with transferable shares is a fear that share ownership might become monopolized by a
few fishermen, while excluding others.

Although the MSA requires conservation and

management measures to be “carried out in such manner that no particular individual,
corporation, or other equity acquires an excessive share of such privileges,” the MSA fails to
define “excessive share.”87

IV.

Most Recent Status of U.S. Fisheries

79

Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(C).
Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(G), (H).
81
Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(E).
82
Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(I).
83
16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(1)(J) (2007).
84
Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(A).
85
National Marine Fisheries Services, The Design and Use of Limited Access Privilege Programs at 60, available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/PartnershipsCommunications/lapp/design_and_useLAPs2007.pdf (last visited, Oct.
22, 2010).
86
Id.
87
16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4) (2007).
80
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a.

NMFS 2009 Status of U.S. Fisheries Report

Every year, NMFS is required to report the status of U.S. fisheries to Congress and the
eight regional Councils.88 The 2009 report was based on the most current stock assessments as
of December 31, 2009.89 Fish stocks are assessed using “the best available scientific information
and status determination criteria specified in a fishery management plan.”90 NMFS assesses
stocks according to standards prepared by the regional Councils; thus, the success of each
Council is assessed using the goals the Councils set for themselves.91
Fish stocks are assessed using the terms “overfishing” and “overfished.” Overfishing
refers to “a stock that . . . has a fishing mortality (harvest) rate above the level that provides for
the maximum sustainable yield.”92 Overfished refers to “a stock that has a biomass level below a
biological threshold specified in its fishery management plan.”93 Both terms indicate that fish
mortality is at a level that prevents a fishery from producing “the maximum sustainable yield on
a continuing basis.”94
Of the 522 stocks assessed in 2009, 250 stocks have a known overfishing status, while
272 stocks have overfishing thresholds that are either not defined, not applicable, or are
unknown.95

This means that the status of approximately 52% of the stocks is currently

unknown.96

Of the 250 stocks that have a known status, 15% are currently subject to

88

Id. § 1851(e)(1).
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, 2009 Status of U.S.
Fisheries, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/statusoffisheries/sos_full28_press.pdf at 1 (last visited Oct. 11, 2010)
[hereinafter Status of Fisheries].
90
Id.
91
EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 17.
92
Status of Fisheries, supra note 89, at 1.
93
Id.
94
16 U.S.C. § 1802(34) (2007).
95
Status of Fisheries, supra note 89, at 5.
96
Id.
89
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overfishing.97 Slightly more stocks have a known overfished status, 23%, while 319 stocks have
overfished thresholds that are either not defined, not applicable, or are unknown.98 Compared to
the 2008 NMFS report, the percentage of stocks subject to overfishing decreased by 1% in
2009,99 and the percentage of overfished stocks remained the same.100
The 1% decrease in stocks subject to overfishing is because scup (Atlantic coast) and
skate (Gulf of Maine) are no longer subject to overfishing; pink shrimp (Gulf of Mexico) was
found to not be subject to overfishing because the previous assessment was invalid.101
According to the 2009 report, no stocks were added to the list of stocks subject to overfishing. 102
Five stocks were found to no longer be considered overfished, 103 while four other stocks
were added to the overfished list.104 When considering this information, it is important to realize
that a “stock cannot be considered „rebuilt‟ within the definition of the [MSA],” until the stock
produces its maximum sustainable yield.105 Four stocks were found to be “fully rebuilt to 100%
of their [biomass maximum sustainable yield] and four other stocks had biomass levels of at least
80% of their maximum sustainable yield.106

97

Id.
Id.
99
Id. at 1. Thirty-eight stocks (15%) were subject to overfishing in 2009 compared to 41 stocks (16%) in 2008. Id.
100
Id. Forty-six stocks (23%) were overfished in both 2008 and in 2009, signifying no improvement. Id.
101
Status of Fisheries, supra note 89, at 1.
102
Id.
103
Id. The following stocks were found to no longer be overfished: scup (Atlantic coast), winter skate (Georges
Bank/Southern New England), bocaccio (Southern Pacific coast), darkblotched rockfish (Pacific coast), and sailfish
(Western Atlantic). Id.
104
Id. The following stocks were added to the overfished list in 2009: canary rockfish (Pacific coast), coho salmon
(Washington coast), queets (Western Strait of Juan de Fuca), and petrale sole (Pacific coast). Id.
105
EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 19.
106
Status of Fisheries, supra note 89, at 2. Scup (Atlantic coast), Black sea bass (Mid-Atlantic coast), Blue king
crab (St. Matthews Island), and Swordfish (North Atlantic), were found to have stocks fully rebuilt to 100% of their
biomass maximum sustainable yield. Id.
98
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b.

Economic Status and Landings of U.S. Fisheries

The most recent landings data available from NMFS indicates that a total of over 7.8
billion pounds of fish were landed in the United States in 2009. The total landings were valued
at over $3.8 billion dollars.107
The latest available information regarding fishery sales and jobs in the U.S. is from 2006.
That year, “U.S. commercial and recreational fisheries generated more than $185 billion in sales
and supported more than two million jobs nationwide.”108 The commercial fishing industry
generated $103 billion in sales and supported 1.5 million jobs, including “harvesters, seafood
processors and dealers, seafood wholesalers and seafood retailers.”109 Recreational saltwater
fishing accounted for $82 billion in sales and supported 534,000 jobs in 2006.110
V.

Existing and Future Problems
Despite numerous amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act and a policy shift that

currently focuses on conservation and management, the nation‟s fisheries are in trouble. Many
factors have contributed to declining fish stocks including inadequate, conflicting, and unclear
provisions of the MSA. The structure of federal fishery management under the MSA has been
criticized for giving “too much authority to those with a financial interest in any resulting fishery
regulation.”111
a.

Structural Issues of the Regional Councils

The eight regional councils are composed in large part of representatives from the fishing
industry, resulting in a relatively homogenous group that is “less likely to produce well
107

See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, Annual Commercial
Landing Statistics, http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st1/commercial/landings/annual_landings.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2010).
108
NOAA Final Guidance, supra note 67.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
KALO, ET AL., supra note 17, at 533.
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considered decisions than groups with diverse membership.”112

When faced with difficult

allocation decisions, Councils have the ability to limit conservation in order to increase catch
limits.113 While NMFS is responsible for supervising the Councils, two studies showed that
“[b]etween 1980 and 2000, NMFS partially disapproved only 62 of approximately 860 proposed
plans, amendments, or annual specifications – resulting in a partial disapproval rate of 7
percent.”114
Another problem with the structure of the MSA is that the Councils are exempt from a
number of federal laws that are “designed to promote beneficial regulation by ensuring objective
officials, open public participation, and transparency in decision-making.”115

The 1996

amendments require Council members to recuse themselves before voting if they have a
financial interest in the decision, and if the decision would have a “significant and predictable
effect on such financial interest.”116 Even after recusal, members may participate in discussions
regarding the decision and may even mark on the record how they would have voted.117 The
conflict of interest rules that do apply to the Councils are significantly weaker than those that
generally apply to federal agencies, and thereby threaten objective decision-making.118
b.

Ambiguous and Conflicting Provisions

Although the 1996 amendments reflected a policy shift away from industry and towards
conservation and ecosystem protection, the MSA now contains ambiguities and conflicting
provisions that have spurred litigation by both industry and non-governmental groups. The
federal court in Massachusetts acknowledged this policy shift in A.M.L. International v. Daley,
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when the fishing industry‟s challenge to a quota restriction was rejected.119 The fishermen
claimed that the FMP did not comply with National Standard Eight, which provides that
“[c]onservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation requirements
of this Act . . . take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities . . .
[and] minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities.”120 Data indicated that the
fishery would totally collapse within two to three years unless the FMP was implemented.121
The court held that the economic consequences of a completely collapsed fishery would
drastically outweigh the short-term economic disadvantages suffered by the fishermen under the
FMP.122
National Standard Eight tends to conflict with National Standard One, which states that
“[c]onservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing.”123 In Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Daley, the D.C. Circuit reversed a decision by the lower court that a FMP
with an eighteen percent chance of success was sufficient. 124 The D.C. Circuit decided that
National Standard One would be satisfied, however, if council management measures have a
fifty-one percent chance of preventing overfishing.125 In Oceana Inc., v. Evans, the court upheld
an amendment to the Northeast Multispecies FMP calling for a plan that would reduce
overfishing gradually in order to phase in stricter fishing limits.126 The plaintiffs argued that
“shall prevent overfishing” means FMPs must end overfishing immediately.127 However, the
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court found that the plan satisfied the Standard because it sought to end overfishing. 128 Rather
than close the stock, the FMP would enable fishermen to stay in business while the fishery
rebuilds.129
Not only has the requirement to prevent overfishing fueled debate, but questions have
also arisen regarding the allowable timeframe Councils have to prevent or end overfishing.
Section 1854(e)(4) of the MSA requires Councils to rebuild a fishery in a time period “as short
as possible,” and not exceeding ten years if biologically possible.130 However, the MSA does not
specify a timeframe when a fishery is not capable of being rebuilt within ten years. 131 In
National Resources Defense Council v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the Ninth Circuit
decided that the MSA gives priority to fisheries conservation rather than the short-term economic
interests of the fishing industry.132 Although the court rejected the Pacific Council‟s plan for
rebuilding the darkblotched rockfish fishery because it did not satisfy the “as short as possible”
language, the court likewise rejected the proposition that a stock unable to be rebuilt in ten years
should automatically close.133 Thus, even under the 2006 amendments which call for plans that
“end overfishing immediately,”134 there is still no clear answer as to the timeframe required for
fisheries that cannot be rebuilt within a ten-year period.
In addition to preventing overfishing, another MSA National Standard pertains to bycatch
reduction. National Standard Nine requires conservation and management efforts to minimize
bycatch and the mortality of such bycatch, “to the extent practicable.” 135 In Conservation Law
Foundation v. Evans, the plaintiffs argued that NMFS, in rejecting the closure of four areas to
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fishing in order to protect essential fish habitat, violated National Standard Nine. 136 Plaintiffs
claimed that closure of the four areas would be beneficial to bycatch and essential fish habitiat,
and therefore, should be implemented.137 The court disagreed, finding plaintiff‟s interpretation
of the provision improperly “equate[d] „practicability‟ with „possibility.‟” 138 By using the term
“practicable,” Congress intended to defer to the Council‟s discretion in deciding how to conserve
and manage the fishery.139 In Pacific Marine Conservation Council v. Evans, rather than defer to
Council‟s discretion, the Court held that the Council failed to consider “practicable”
conservation and management alternatives.140 By failing to consider an observer program or
discard caps, the Council did not fully contemplate “practicable” bycatch reduction options.141
While several MSA sections have resulted in litigation, National Standard Two has been
one of the more frequently contested provisions.

National Standard Two mandates

“[c]onservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific information
available.”142 Since scientific information is often plagued by uncertainty, Council decisions are
challenged on the basis of inadequate scientific information. Both Hadaja, Inc. v. Evans143 and
Midwater Trawler Cooperative v. Department of Commerce144 indicate that Councils must
support their conservation, management, and allocation decisions with scientific rationale. For
example, “merely stating in conclusory fashion that [a FMP] was considered in light of scientific
evidence does not bring [a FMP] within the requirements of National Standard Two.” 145 As
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cases are decided, ambiguous and conflicting MSA provisions are gradually addressed but there
is certainly room for improvement within the Act.
c.

Looking Ahead

Given the rapidly declining state of U.S. fisheries, the need for effective conservation and
management is more apparent than ever. Two of the more recent approaches used by Councils
to protect fisheries are individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and sector management. ITQ
systems allocate a share of the total allowable catch to each fisherman and allow fishermen to
buy or lease ITQs from other fishermen.146 One of the problems with this approach is deciding
which fishermen get an ITQ and how much the total allowable catch will be for the fishery.147
Under a sector management system, which was recently implemented by the New England
Fishery Management Council, groups of fishermen voluntarily join together as permit holders to
manage the allocation of fish in their sector.148 The fishermen sign a binding contract that
requires them to stay within the total allowable catch limit for their sector.149 Potential problems
may arise if fishermen are not well organized in monitoring and reporting, if one member of a
sector exceeds the allocation for the group, or if a species is overfished.150
Under both ITQ and sector allocation schemes, questions have arisen regarding property
rights and the public trust interest in fishery resources. Both systems limit entry into a fishery, so
fishermen already within the system may continue to catch fish according to the total allowable
catch but new fishermen may be unable to gain entry. 151 Since fish have historically been
considered a public trust asset, one issue is whether ITQs or sectors should be considered
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property rights.152 If they are considered property rights, then do ITQs and sectors amount to a
constitutional taking of the public trust resources?153
Another area of uncertainty is how the application of the MSA will confront new
challenges in the future such as marine spatial planning and the development of offshore energy.
On July 19, 2010, President Obama signed an Executive Order establishing a National Policy for
the Stewardship of the Ocean, Coasts, and Great Lakes, which was developed by the Interagency
Ocean Policy Task Force.154 Although NOAA is identified as a member of the task force, NMFS
is not; this has sparked discussion among Councils that are concerned with participating in the
development of any Coastal Marine Spatial Plans.155 At a Council Coordination Committee
meeting in May 2010, Council members expressed a desire “to clarify that [Coastal Marine
Spatial Planning] action [does not] subvert the MSA.”156
VI.

Conclusion
Since passage in 1976, the MSA has remained the primary governing law for fisheries

management in the United States.157 While the MSA has been amended over time in response to
evolving scientific, economic, and social information, new challenges lie ahead for the
sustainable management of the nation‟s fisheries. As the demand for fish continues to increase,
both in the United States and globally, the need to properly manage and protect this valuable
resource will only become more imminent.
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